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BURDEN OF EVIDENCE IN INVESTMENT SURCHARGE
CASES IN PENNSYLVANIA
In investment surcharge cases, what evidence must an exceptant to a
trustee's account produce to make out a prima facie case of negligent mis-
management? How can the trustee rebut this prima facie case? This Comment
will concern itself with the answers to those questions, answers which lie
largely in an analysis of equitable factors considered by the courts when
they fashion the burden of evidence. Those factors control the burden of
evidence in a trust surcharge case. They determine on whom the burden
rests, how heavy the burden is, and, to some extent, what kind of evidence is
necessary to sustain the burden. As a result of the influence of these equitable
considerations, present in some cases and absent in others, the burden of
evidence may vary considerably from case to case.
Before discussing the specific effects of these factors, certain preliminary
observations are necessary. In order for an exceptant to a trustee's account
to prove mismanagement, he must prove a breach of trust.' The exceptant
relying on negligence must prove a specific 2 violation of the standard of
care applicable to the trustee's fiduciary position. Calhoun's Estate3 early
expounded the standard of care generally applicable to trustees in Pennsyl-
vania: "common skill, common prudence, and common caution."' 4 A more
recent declaration of this duty is found in the Fiduciaries Investment Act of
1949:
The exercise of that degree of judgment and care, under the circum-
stances then prevailing, which men of prudence, discretion and in-
telligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in
regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of
their funds, considering the probable income to be derived there-
from as well as the probable safety of their capital.5
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 204 (1959).
2. Burke Appeal, 378 Pa. 616, 626, 108 A.2d 58, 64 (1954) : "Since the exceptant
had alleged a breach of trust by the trustees, the burden of persuasion was on him to
prove the particulars of any wrongful conduct . . .
3. 6 Watts 185 (Pa. 1837).
4. Id. at 188.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 821.6(1), 821.9(1) (1950). See Headley, Trust
Investments-Fundamental Principles Lawyers Should Know, 91 TRUSTS & ESTATES
739 (1952), where it is stated: "I know of no case where a trustee has been surcharged
for a failure to enlarge . . . the trust. In fact the hazards of attempting it are so
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This statement of the applicable standard is general in nature; the broad
language permits courts to apply the standard with remarkable flexibility.
Decisions disclose that the presence or absence of certain significant factors in
the cases exerts considerably greater influence on the courts' application of
the standard than any statement of the standard.
One equitable factor of particular importance in delimiting the proper
range of investment is a discretionary power in the trust instrument. 6 The ex-
istence and scope of a discretionary power is not always obvious. Since, as
a rule, it is to the trustee's benefit to establish the power, he introduces the
evidence on this issue. Suppose a trustee wants to rely on a discretionary
power to widen the zone of permissible investment in order to justify in-
vestment in or retention of certain stocks. In that event, a presumption
that the power for which he contends does not exist will operate against
him.7 Pennsylvania courts require the trustee to establish such a power
"with the utmost clearness,"8 to overcome the presumption. The logical
foundation on which this presumption rests is the reluctance of courts to
permit a trustee to exceed the proper sphere of safe investment, as decreed
by the legislature,9 in the absence of unquestionable authority from the
settlor to do so. Conversely, in those comparatively rare cases in which it
is contended that the trust instrument has restricted the proper area of
investment,10 the burden of establishing the narrowness of discretion should
fall on the exceptant. Such a restriction likewise varies the usual legislative
standard as to the proper scope of investment, and should be construed with
great that the usual methods of doing so, through business and speculation, are normally
prohibited . . . by law."
6. Lerch Estate, 399 Pa. 59, 159 A.2d 506 (1960).
7. Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 121 Atl. 310 (1923) ; Barker's Estate, 159 Pa.
518, 529, 28 Atl. 365, 367 (1894) (dictum) ; Wood's Estate, 130 Pa. Super. 397, 197
Atl. 638 (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 227, comment u (1959). Cf.
Commonwealth Trust Co. Case, 331 Pa. 569, 575, 1 A.2d 662, 666 (1938): "[A cor-
porate trustee] must justify every expenditure as a proper one according to the terms
of the instrument under which it is acting, or the power and authority conferred upon it."
8. Taylor's Estate, supra note 7, at 524, 121 Atl. at 311.
9. Statutes determine what investments are authorized for trustees in Pennsylvania.
For this state's legal list of authorized investments, see generally the Fiduciaries Invest-
ment Act of 1949, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 821.1-821.20 (1950).
Subject only to the provisions of the trust instrument, if any, a fiduciary
may accept, hold, invest in, and retain, any of the investments authorized by
this act, and shall not be liable. for loss on such investments so long as he
exercises due care and prudence in the performance of his duties in regard to
them. "Legal investment" or "authorized investment" or words of similar import
used in a trust instrument shall be construed to mean any investment authorized
by this act.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 821.2 (1950). For a discussion of recent amendments to this
act, see Fiduciary Rev., Nov., 1961, p. 1.
10. E.g., Dillon's Estate, 324 Pa. 252, 188 Atl. 134 (1936). It is declared by statute
that the settlor may, by express provision in the trust instrument, restrict or enlarge
the scope of investment. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 821.18 (1950).
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similar strictness." Akin to provisions widening or narrowing the scope of
investment are provisions which purport to alter the trustee's ordinary
liability. Since these provisions are also in derogation of what would other-
wise be the governing law, they too are eyed with disfavor and strictly
construed. In Hammett's Estate,'1 2 a provision relieving the trustee "from
any loss my estate may sustain by reason of the exercise of the discretion
herein given" was held ineffective to relieve the trustee from liability for
ordinary negligence. That wording was not sufficiently specific to include
negligence in the exercise of the power.1 3 To be effective, discretionary or
exculpatory language must cover very clearly the transaction questioned,
because all doubts will be resolved against the party who would use the
provision to alter the law.
14
Assuming a discretionary power forces its way through those presump-
tions against it, a great deal of weight will be accorded it. "In considering the
responsibility of the accountant for its action [it is necessary to bear]
. . .always in mind the authority . . . vested .... ,,15 While invariably
Pennsylvania courts give the power careful consideration, some of them have
given the presence of the power more weight than others. In some cases,
it would appear that the only effect of the power is to shift the burden of
evidence on the negligence issue. 16 That is, although the exceptant can point
to an investment which would otherwise be illegal, if the trustee shows
authority in the trust instrument for making or retaining the questioned
investment, the burden shifts back to the exceptant to prove negligence on
the part of the trustee. The trustee has discharged for the moment his
duty to account for the investment. 1 7 Under this approach, the standard of
care has not changed; only ordinary negligence need be shown.' 8 Other cases
attach more weight to the presence of a discretionary power. 9 Not only does
11. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 227, comment u (1959).
12. 23 Pa. D. & C. 353, 356-57 (Orphans' Ct. 1935).
13. Where the provisions are very clear, however, they will protect the trustee
from liability for negligence. Spring v. Hawkes, 351 Pa. 602, 41 A.2d 538 (1945)
(instrument relieving trustee from liability except for gross negligence or willful mis-
conduct).
14. Taylor's Estate, supra note 7.
15. Dickinson's Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 247, 249 (Orphans' Ct. 1934), aff'd, 318 Pa.
561, 179 Atl. 443 (1935) ; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 227(c) (1959).
16. Glauser Estate, 350 Pa. 192, 38 A.2d 64 (1944) ; Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305,
12 A.2d 71 (1940) ; Clay's Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C. 257 (Orphans' Ct. 1936) (semble)
Dickinson's Estate, supra note 15.
17. Carwithen's Estate, 327 Pa. 490, 493, 194 Atl. 743, 745 (1937) (dictum) : "If a
trust investment is properly questioned, the burden of showing the wisdom or propriety
of his conduct in making it is on the trustee." Cf. Mintz v. Brock, 193 Pa. 294, 44 Atl.
417 (1899); Puterbaugh's Estate, 44 Pa. Super. 102 (1910); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 172, comment b (1959).
18. Cases cited note 16 supra; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 227, com-
ment u (1959).
19. Lerch Estate, supra note 6; Jones' Estate, 344 Pa. 100, 23 A.2d 434 (1942);
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the burden of evidence shift, but the standard of care changes. No longer is
ordinary negligence the test of liability ;2" rather, "a trustee will not be held
personally liable for the honest exercise of a discretionary power in the
absence of supine negligence .... -21 Such negligence may be required "as
raises a presumption of willful default." 22 Most courts which apply as the
standard of care this measure of supine negligence do not define the term.
Recently, however, a definition of conduct which violates the supine
negligence standard has developed: "clearly unwise and unjustifiable in the
exercise of ordinarily good business judgment.
'23
The effect given discretionary powers, shifting the burden of evidence
and, in the majority of cases, altering the standard of care, can be rationalized
in several ways. The requirement of supine negligence reflects a reluctance to
determine whether discretionary powers were properly exercised. 24 By
inserting such a provision, the settlor is presumed to have intended that the
judgment and discretion of the trustee should control, and the courts should
interfere as little as possible.2 5 Discretionary powers will be exercised over-
cautiously if trustees are frequently checked in exercising them, and so
the settlors' intent will be thwarted. The crux of the reasoning appears to be
the desire to give such powers an effect likely to further the settlors' ends
in employing them in the first place.
To appreciate fully the effects of discretionary powers, it may be helpful
to devote some thought to cases in which no such power exists. Here is the
converse of the previously discussed situation; now the trustee has un-
authorized stocks in his possession. Of course, if the trustee invests in
stocks, in the absence of authority from either statute or trust instrument
Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 21 A.2d 72 (1941) ; Dempster's Estate, 308 Pa. 153, 162
Atl. 447 (1932) ; Harts' Estate, 203 Pa. 480, 53 Atl. 364 (1902) ; Bartol's Estate, 182
Pa. 407, 38 Atl. 527 (1897) ; Reik's Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 252 (Orphans' Ct. 1933).
The approach selected by a court may depend on the equities of the respective
parties. As a rule, if the discretionary power relaxes the standard of care, no surcharge
is imposed. But see Harts' Estate, supra and Reik's Estate, supra. Perhaps it should be
noted that the discretionary power was described as a "restricted" one in Harts' Estate,
supra at 487, 53 Atl. at 366.
20. A power to retain, coupled with a narrow market, was sufficient to overcome
a surcharge which would otherwise have attached under the prudent man rule in
Dempster's Estate, supra note 19.
21. Detre's Estate, 273 Pa. 341, 350, 117 Atl. 54, 57 (1922) (emphasis added),
quoted approvingly in Dempster's Estate, supra note 19, at 159, 162 Atl. at 448.
22. Bartol's Estate, supra note 19, at 411, 38 Atl. at 528. But a discretionary power
will not excuse the trustee's complete inattentiveness to the investments. Blish Trust,
350 Pa. 311, 38 A.2d 9 (1944) (retention for six years of stock paying no income and
constituting a large part of the corpus).
23. Lerch Estate, supra note 6, at 65, 159 A.2d at 510.
24. The terms of the trust may be broad enough to authorize the trustee to make
investments which a prudent man would not make. Greenhouse's Trust Estate, 338 Pa.
144, 12 A.2d 96 (1940).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 187, comment e (1959).
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to do so, he commits a breach of trust.26 Of more importance for study of
the standard of care and burden of evidence is the following situation: the
trustee has acquired the settlor's stocks, some of which are nonlegals, and
has not yet disposed of them, though not authorized to retain nonlegals. The
trustee is not required to convert the nonlegals into legal stocks at once. If
the market is poor, he may bide his time, awaiting a more judicious op-
portunity to sell. The Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949 expressly provides
for this situation: "A fiduciary may retain without liability for resulting loss
any asset received in kind, even though it is not an authorized investment,
provided he exercises due care and prudence in the disposition or retention
of any such nonlegal investment. ' 27 However, when stocks are retained
in the absence of authority, a heavy burden of proving that retention was not
negligent rests on the trustee,28 and the longer the stocks are kept, the
greater the burden becomes.29 Furthermore, it is clear that ordinary negli-
gence will constitute a breach of duty in this situation-supine negligence
need not be shown.30 The burden of evidence and the standard of care are
the converse of what they would be if a discretionary power were in the
case.
Discretionary powers are not the only means of altering the standard
of care and the burden of evidence; one factor which may have similar
effect in a surcharge case is acquiescence. Acquiescence may appear to operate
as a partial defense to the trustee, but unlike a discretionary power, acqui-
escence may also be a complete defense. That difference between the two
factors arises because the policy behind the courts' weighing acquiescence
in arriving at their determinations rests on entirely different ground than
the reasoning behind the consideration they give a discretionary power.
The policy behind the consideration given to acquiescence probably springs
from the concept volenti non fit injuria. This concept of acquiescence thus
26. Commonwealth ex rel. v. McConnel, 226 Pa. 244, 75 Atl. 367 (1910): a fidu-
ciary invests in nonlegals at his own risk; good faith and sound judgment are immaterial.
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 821.14 (1950) ; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 231 (1959). For a consideration of the effects of the Fiduciaries Investment Act of
1949 on pre-existing law, see generally Note, Retention of Trust Investments, 55 DICK.
L. REV. 342 (1951).
28. Lewis' Estate, 344 Pa. 586, 26 A.2d 445 (1942) ; Casani's Estate, 342 Pa. 468,
21 A.2d 59 (1941) ; Reinhard's Estate, 322 Pa. 325, 185 Atl. 298 (1936) ; Taylor's
Estate, supra note 7; Mellier's Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 595 (Orphans' Ct. 1933), aff'd,
312 Pa. 157, 167 Atl. 358 (1933) ; Curran's Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 103 (Orphans' Ct.
1932). 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 230.2 (1939), quoted in Casani's Estate, supra at 483, 21
A.2d at 65 (concurring opinion). The trustee "is the one with knowledge of the practical
difficulties, the lack of a market, and the like." Mellier's Estate, supra at 598. But would
that not be the case when a discretionary power is present?
29. Blish Trust, supra note 22; Casani's Estate, supra note 28; cf. Curran's Estate,
supra note 28.
30. Taylor's Estate, supra note 7.
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has much in common with the philosophy behind the tort concept of
assumption of risk: one who consents to the consequences of wrongful
conduct should not be heard to complain. To be true to theory and analogy,
if acquiescence be proven to the satisfaction of the court, there should be
no surcharge liability for breach of trust. Numerous cases so hold.31 These
cases have the support of the Restatement of Trusts: if, to use the Restatement
term, consent to the trustee's investment decision is shown, the trustee is
not liable for a loss on that investment .2
Since acquiescence may wholly bar a claim of mismanagement, it be--
comes important to note the kind and amount of evidence the trustee must
introduce to avoid a surcharge. Most commonly introduced is evidence show--
ing the exceptant's approval of the investment. Approval of the investment
in previous accounts, for example, may be sufficient.3 3 Tacit approval may be
evidenced by a failure to object to regular statements showing the nature of
the investment.3 4 In addition, the lapse of time during which the current
exceptant might have objected is important, since a long delay will invoke
the equitable doctrine of laches in conjunction with acquiescence.3 5 Certainly,
approval of the investment coupled with the receipt of benefits from the in-
vestment by the present exceptant will raise the defense of acquiescence. 5
It would be patently inequitable to permit a beneficiary to enjoy the benefits
of a speculative investment for so long as it may remain lucrative, and to
throw the loss on the trustee as soon as the investment ceases to be productive.
Evidence of this type of conduct bars a surcharge.
Evidence of acquiescence can, however, be overcome. Though chargeable
with conduct from which acquiescence may be inferred, an exceptant may
come forward with evidence indicating he had no knowledge of the facts
concerning the mismanagement.37 This evidence, coupled with a showing that
the trustee must reasonably have known that the exceptant's knowledge was
31. Walton Estate, 348 Pa. 143, 34 A.2d 484 (1943) ; Clabby's Estate, supra note
16; Wilbur's Estate, 334 Pa. 45, 5 A.2d 325 (1939) ; Rambo's Estate, 327 Pa. 258, 193
Atl. 1 (1937) ; Stephen's Estate, 320 Pa. 97, 181 Atl. 559 (1935) ; Macfarlane's Estate,
317 Pa. 377, 177 Atl. 12 (1935) ; Towne's Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C. 641 (Orphans' Ct.
1936); Elverson's Estate, 15 Pa. D. & C. 383 (Orphans' Ct. 1931) ; cf. Grote Trust,
390 Pa. 261, 135 A.2d 383 (1957) (signed waiver held to bar surcharge).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 216 (1959).
33. See Clabby's Estate, supra note 16.
34. Wilbur's Estate, supra note 31 ; Towne's Estate, supra note 31.
35. Wilbur's Estate, supra note 31; see Towne's Estate, supra note 31; Maser's
Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 559 (Orphans' Ct. 1934).
36. Clabby's Estate, supra note 16.
37. Bard's Estate, 339 Pa. 433, 13 A.2d 711 (1940) ; Macfarlane's Estate, supra
note 31, at 382, 177 Atl. at 15 (dictum) ; Rothermel's Estate, 47 Pa. D. & C. 478
(Orphans' Ct. 1943).
Here again notice the analogy between acquiescence and assumption of risk.
Knowledge is also a prerequisite for assumption of risk.
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inadequate, will rebut the trustee's assertion of acquiescence.38 The burden
of proving that any information supplied by the trustee was inadequate is on
the exceptant.3 9 The policy against permitting one to recover who has
consented to the wrongful conduct requires the exceptant to dispel all infer-
ences to be drawn from his conduct.
The policy behind the defense of acquiescence is so strong as to have
some effect on the outcome of a case even though the evidence of acquiescence
is insufficient to raise a complete bar. When there is some evidence of
acquiescence but not such evidence as would demand the exceptant be barred,
the standard of care and the burden of evidence are influenced with results
very analogous to the effects of a discretionary power. Evidence of acqui-
escence is permitted to lower the standard of care and increase the burden
of evidence on the exceptant.
4 0
It is not without significance that appellants, both of whom are
college graduates and women of social position, and who, as it
appears, were at all times aware of the challenged investments and
familiar with the properties by which they were secured, indicated no
dissatisfaction whatever with the manner in which these investments
were handled by accountant until their request for the account-
ings .... 41
Consideration of such evidence may be explained on the ground that the
belief of a beneficiary that a particular disposition is advisable is evidence
of the wisdom of that course of action. 42 This rationale is not particularly
convincing as a justification of the weight given by the courts to evidence of
acquiescence. If one is looking for evidence of prudence, much better
evidence exists than the previous wishes of the current exceptant. The
significance attached to acquiescence by the courts is explained more ade-
quately as a reflection of the strong policy against permitting one to recover
who has encouraged the mismanagement. But whatever their reasoning,
courts give weight to even slight evidence of acquiescence in determining
whether to impose a surcharge. The trustee is well advised to introduce any
evidence available to him which would point in that direction, though he
well knows the evidence of acquiescence is insufficient to bar the claim.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 216(2) (b) (1959); cf. Linnard's Estate,
16 Pa. D. & C. 143 (Orphans' Ct. 1931), petition for bill of review denied, 200 Pa. 32,
148 Atl. 912 (1930).
39. Macfarlane's Estate, supra, note 31. Initially, however, the trustee may have
the burden of showing that some information was supplied. Bard's Estate, supra note 37.
40. Greenawalt's Estate, 343 Pa. 413, 21 A.2d 890 (1941) ; Saeger Estates, 340 Pa.
73, 16 A.2d 19 (1940); Shipley's Estate (No. 1), 337 Pa. 571, 12 A.2d 343 (1940)
Gardner's Estate, 323 Pa. 229, 185 Atl. 804 (1936).
41. Saeger Estates, supra note 40, at 80, 16 A.2d at 23.
42. Gardner's Estate, supra note 40, at 233, 185 Atl. at 806.
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The converse of acquiescence is evidence of previous protest by the
exceptant to the trustee's course of action. Such evidence has the effect one
logically would expect: previous protest reduces the exceptant's burden
on the negligence issue.43 The effect of protest on the burden of evidence,
however, is not as pronounced as that of acquiescence. Due weight must
be given the consideration that the trustee is charged with the duty of in-
terposing his judgment between the wishes of the protesting beneficiary
and the trust fund, if the trustee considers the beneficiary ill-advised.
44
Besides acquiescence and discretionary powers, a variety of factors may
influence the standard of care and burden of evidence in individual cases.
45
Courts consider the type of trustee in determining what may be expected
of him in the way of prudent management. Is this an experienced corporate
trustee or is the testator's widow the fiduciary? Obviously this factor should,
and does, affect the standard exacted.46 Aside from the requirement that one
should employ whatever skill he has,47 a distinction between corporate and
private trustees may be drawn on the ground that the settlor would intend the
latter to be held only to the lesser standard.
48
The courts also consider, in setting the standard, the nature of the mis-
conduct alleged. Is there some evidence of bad faith on the part of the
trustee ?49 Or was the trustee honestly trying to further the settlor's intent ?5o
Is the investment questioned one which the trustee actually made, or has he
only retained it, perhaps awaiting a better opportunity to sell ?51 Is the stock
43. Maser's Estate, supra note 35, at 561 (dictum) ; Mellier's Estate, supra note 28.
Indeed, these cases support the proposition that when a trustee retains nonlegals in the
absence of authority to do so, he must obey a demand to sell.
44. Dickinson's Estate, supra note 15, at 251. In this case, there was authority to
retain nonlegals. Contrast the approach of the court in this case with that taken in the
two cited in note 43 supra.
45. See Moore, A Rationalization of Trust Surcharge Cases, 96 U. PA. L. REv.
651-62 (1947).
46. Glassburner's Estate, 40 Pa. Super. 134 (1909) (trustee testator's brother and
not an active businessman) ; Merrell's Estate, 25 Pa. Dist. 323, 326 (Orphans' Ct. 1916)
A widow is a favorite of the law. . . . We would not give full scope to
this testator's will if we . . . held her liable for the investments made by her
in good faith, but which . . . would seem to have been injudicious.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 227, comment d (1959).
47. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 541 (2d ed. 1960).
48. Merrell's Estate, supra note 46, at 325: "Is it not fair to infer . . . that [the
settlor] . . . had in contemplation the possibility that his wife might make [the chal-
lenged] . . . investments ?"
49.- McGuffey's Estate, 123 Pa. Super. 432, 187 At. 298 (1936), held that when
a corporate trustee purchases a mortgage from itself, the burden is on the trustee to
show that due care was exercised in the purchase. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 170, comment i (1959).
50. The background of the settlor is considered in determining whether an invest-
ment is proper-retention of an investment made by the settlor might be found to be
in accordance with his intent. Appeal by Stewart, 110 Pa. 410, 6 At. 321 (1885).
51. See Dempster's Estate, supra note 19, at 160, 162 At. at 448.
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which the trustee holds legal or nonlegal? Despite a discretionary power,
perhaps some weight should be given the legislative determination of what
investments are proper.
52
All the equitable factors that have been discussed are cast in the balance
in arriving at a determination of the standard of care and the burden of
evidence. Whenever circumstances are present which mitigate the trustee's
alleged offense, the standard of care is accordingly reduced and the ex-
ceptant's burden of producing evidence of negligence becomes correspondingly
heavier. Whenever circumstances are present which aggravate the offense,
the standard of care is increased, and the exceptant's burden of producing
evidence of negligence is decreased.
The final consideration is how the burden of evidence may be met.
What sort of evidence is used by the exceptant to imply negligence, and
what sort is used by the trustee to rebut inferences of negligence? Evidence
introduced by the exceptant indicating the trustee failed to take steps which
trustees usually take in the exercise of prudence results in an inference of
negligence; if the trustee is then unable to introduce some evidence of care,53
the inference stands. One concludes that no attention was paid the invest-
ments. 54 The trustee is expected to come forward with evidence of care
because he alone knows what measures were adopted to insure prudent
investment and retention.55
As to care in making investments, evidence must be introduced on the
crucial issue whether the trustee has made a diligent investigation of the
stock or has invested haphazardly.56 Matters which a trustee should consider
when investing are all those relating to the safety of the fund and the regu-
larity of the income.57 "Ordinarily this involves securing, information from
52. See Casani's Estate, supra note 28, at 481, 21 A.2d at 65 (concurring opinion).
53. Lentz Estate, 364 Pa. 304, 72 A.2d 276 (1950) (expert testimony as to negli-
gence outweighed by evidence of frequent consideration given investments).
54. Blish Trust, supra note 22; Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 5 A.2d 208
(1939) ; Kelch's Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 204 (Orphans' Ct. 1934), aff'd, 318 Pa. 296, 178
Atl. 129 (1935).
The evidence clearly reveals . .. no consideration . . . . It is most apparent
that the trustees . . . did nothing ....
At no place in the testimony does it appear that the accountant ever considered
the advisability of converting the stock into legal investments. Neither does
it appear that the officers of the company or the individual trustee ever con-
sidered the intrinsic value of the stock and the question whether, at any par-
ticular time ...it would be a sacrifice to sell, or whether the current market
quotation was a fair price . . . . It does not affirmatively appear that such
tests were ever applied by anybody.
Kelch's Estate, supra at 211.
55. Mellier's Estate, supra note 28.
56. See Ihmsen's Appeal, 43 Pa. 431 (1862) ; Hammett's Estate, supra note 12;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 227, comment b (1959).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 227, comment o (1959). Specifically, the
Restatement suggests consideration of:
(1) the marketability of the particular investment; (2) the length of the term
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sources on which prudent men in the community customarily rely. 5 8 Market
conditions should be evaluated with respect to stocks.59 A trustee should
avail himself of any information to which he has access pertaining to the
background of the stock.60 The stock should be considered in light of other
investments in the trust; evidence of diversity is evidence of care.61
When care in retaining investments is in issue, evidence is important
which bears on whether the trustee has fulfilled his duty to keep himself in-
formed as to the continued safety of the stocks. The Restatement of Trusts
puts his burden thus:
The trustee is under a duty to use reasonable care to keep himself
informed in regard to the property which he holds in trust, although
he is not under a duty to watch the stock ticker or to keep himself
informed as to the daily fluctuations in the market price, as a mere
speculator would do.
62
Though the trustee does not have to watch daily fluctuations, proof of
frequent consideration of the stocks6 3 or, from an exceptant's standpoint,
proof of infrequent consideration is important; if the trustee has not con-
sidered the stock fairly often, the possibility is 'suggested that retention
resulted primarily from inattention. When the trustee considers the stock,
he must "study carefully the circumstances and conditions" controlling
"the value of the investment. '6 4 The trustee should follow the market and
consider fluctuation of prices. 65 If the trustee can prove there was no
of the investment, for example, the maturity date, if any, the callability or
redeemability if any; (3) the probable duration of the trust; (4) the probable
condition of the market with respect to the value of the particular investment
at the termination of the trust especially if at the termination of the trust the
investment must be converted into money for the purpose of distribution;
(5) the probable condition of the market with respect to reinvestment at the
time when the particular investment matures; (6) the aggregate value of the
trust estate and the nature of the other investments; (7) the requirements of
the beneficiary or beneficiaries, particularly with respect to the amount of the
income; (8) the other assets of the beneficiary or beneficiaries including earning
capacity; (9) the effect of the investment in increasing or diminishing liability
for taxes; (10) the likelihood of inflation.
Cases considering those items: (2) Edward's Estate, 6 Pa. D. & C. 121 (Orphans'
Ct. 1925) ; (3) McGuffey's Estate, supra note 49; (7) Kipp's Estate, 277 Pa. 294, 121
Atl. 57 (1923) ; Estate of Old, 176 Pa. 150, 34 Ati. 1022 (1896) ; (8) Kipp's Estate,
supra; Estate of Old, supra.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 227, comment b (1959).
59. Casani's Estate, supra note 28; Mitchell's Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 225 (Orphans'
Ct. 1934).
60. Jones' Estate, supra note 19.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 228 (1959) ; but see Elkins' Estate, 20 Pa.
D. & C. 483 (Orphans' Ct. 1934) (repudiating duty to diversify), aff'd, 325 Pa. 373, 190
Atl. 650 (1937); see generally Note, Trusts-Trustee's Duty to Diversify Investments,
89 U. PA. L. REV. 536 (1941).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 231, comment b (1959).
63. Lentz Estate, supra note 53.
64. Clay's Estate, supra note 16, at 265.
65. Casani's Estate, supra note 28, at 475-77, 21 A.2d at 62-63.
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market for stocks that allegedly should have been disposed of, there can
be no surcharge.66
In connection with evidence on the issue of care in either the selection
or retention of investments, trustees should keep written records indicating
the consideration given investments.67 The records should include: (1) any
information bearing on market conditions and the study of the investments
in light of those conditions; (2) reports from financial services;68 (3) in-
formation gathered from investment journals,69 stock digests, 70 and newspaper
quotations ;71 (4) thoughts expressed by other investors in interviews ;72 and
(5) minutes of meetings of trustees (if more than one) at which advisability
of purchase and retention of stocks is discussed.
78
Finally, to what extent will the advice of counsel as to the propriety
of making or retaining a particular investment protect the trustee? Certainly,
that the trustee has sought such advice should be some evidence of care.
74
On the question of legality of a given investment, perhaps the advice of
counsel should be full protection. 75 As to the prudence of making the
investment, the trustee can substitute no one's judgment for his own.76 The
opinion of the attorney can only be of value to indicate that the trustee did
consult others before arriving at his determination whether a given investment
was a prudent one.
In conclusion, it is emphasized that the location, weight, and, in some
cases, nature of the burden of evidence are determined by a number of ex-
trinsic factors of varying significance according to their equitable value.
What the courts look for to determine whether the parties have met their
burden of evidence accords with the practical realities of the business world.
66. Glauser Estate, supra note 16; Reinhard's Estate, supra note 28; O'Brien's
Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 501 (Orphans' Ct. 1933) (narrow market).
67. Stirling's Estate, supra note 19, at 504, 21 A.2d at 76.
68. Id. at 505, 21 A.2d at 76.
69. Casani's Estate, supra note 28, at 474, 21 A.2d at 62.
70. Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 506, 21 A.2d 72, 76 (1941).
71. Casani's Estate, supra note 28, at 474, 21 A.2d at 62.
72. Ibid.
73. See generally Moore, supra note 45, at 663-72.
74. Stirling's Estate, supra note 70; Lindsay's Estate, 211 Pa. 536, 166 Atl. 848
(1933) ; Dempster's Estate, 308 Pa. 153, 162 Atl. 447 (1932) ; Whitecar's Estate, 147
Pa. 368, 23 Ati. 575 (1892) ; Grossman's Estate, 22 Pa. D. & C. 531 (Orphans' Ct.
1935) ; Reik's Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C. 252 (Orphans' Ct. 1933).
75. Dempster's Estate, supra note 74; Reik's Estate, supra note 74, at 256 (dictum)
but see Grossman's Estate, supra note 74 (trustee accountable for gross error, not-
withstanding advice of counsel).
76. Whitecar's Estate, supra note 74, at 369, 23 Atd. at 575: "[E]ven the advice
of counsel will not justify a man in abandoning his own common sense"; Reik's Estate,
supra note 74.
1963]
184 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
Courts look for those indicia of caution and circumspection which charac-
terize the actions of intelligent businessmen. Proof of mismanagement is
proof of imprudent disposition of the trust res, unjustified by mitigating
circumstances.
MELVIN M. DILDINE
